The EMC board of directors conducts regular, ongoing assessments of EMC’s business strategy, competitive position and prospects to best position EMC to successfully compete in the rapidly changing IT infrastructure environment and meet evolving customer requirements. In this regard, the EMC board of directors,
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together with senior management, engages in regular, in-depth evaluations of EMC’s Federation operating model and strategic alternatives, in each case with a view to improving EMC’s operations and financial performance and enhancing shareholder value. In particular, over the course of the last several years, the EMC board of directors and senior management have reviewed and considered a variety of strategic alternatives in light of growing challenges and disruptions in the IT industry caused by macro trends towards technology that is mobile, social, cloud-based and big data-driven and which have increased competition in the IT industry and reduced customer demand for traditional storage products. In the past, these reviews have resulted in the EMC board of directors considering a variety of enhancements to its operating model, code-named “Federation 2.X,” including, among other alternatives, a spin-off of EMC’s shares in VMware to EMC shareholders, capital restructuring transactions, the creation of a tracking stock with respect to EMC’s economic interest in VMware, share buy-backs, strategic alliances and acquisition transactions and, more recently, alternatives such as a strategic sale of EMC as a whole, take-private transactions and industry consolidation acquisitions.
From 2012 through the end of September 2015, the EMC board of directors, with assistance from outside consultants, reviewed and discussed EMC’s plans for CEO succession.
In connection with its ongoing review of strategic alternatives, commencing in November 2013, the EMC board of directors and senior management, with the assistance of EMC’s financial advisors and legal counsel, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, referred to as Skadden, engaged in discussions and negotiations with Company X, a leading global provider of enterprise information technology products and services, regarding a potential business combination transaction. The parties ceased discussions regarding a potential transaction in mid-October 2014.
On July 11, 2014, each of Elliott Associates, L.P. and Elliott International Limited, referred to collectively as the Elliott Parties, notified EMC that it intended to file a Hart-Scott Rodino Notification and Report Form with the FTC and the DOJ regarding its intention to acquire a significant interest in EMC’s common stock. The Elliott Parties filed their respective notices with the FTC and the DOJ on July 14, 2014 and, since that time, have held a significant interest in EMC’s common stock.
On July 21, 2014, The Wall Street Journal reported that an affiliate of the Elliott Parties, Elliott Management Corp., referred to as Elliott Management, and, together with the Elliott Parties, referred to as Elliott, planned to push for a breakup of EMC through a spin-off of EMC’s shares in VMware.
From mid-July 2014 through early October 2014, EMC engaged in a number of discussions with representatives of Elliott regarding Elliott’s perspectives on strategic alternatives EMC might undertake to enhance shareholder value and on the composition of the EMC board of directors. During this period, EMC, with the assistance of Skadden, also engaged in negotiations with Elliott and its legal counsel regarding the terms of a draft confidentiality and standstill agreement.
On September 24, 2014, Michael S. Dell, the Chief Executive Officer and a director of Denali, contacted Joseph Tucci, EMC’s Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, to discuss their respective views of market trends and to assess EMC’s interest in a potential transaction between EMC and Denali.
At a meeting of the EMC board of directors held on October 6, 2014, the board discussed with members of EMC’s management and EMC’s then financial advisors, among other matters, the risks and challenges posed by various strategic alternatives under review by EMC’s management, including a spin-off of EMC’s shares in VMware to EMC shareholders and a potential transaction with Company X. The board of directors also discussed with management exploring the possibility of partnering with Dell or acquiring certain assets from Dell. At the meeting, the directors expressed their concerns regarding the proposed valuation of the company as well as, among other matters, the execution risks of a potential transaction with Company X, risks associated with Company X’s competitive position and the respective prospects of Company X’s key businesses. The directors also determined, among other matters, that EMC’s financial advisors should prepare an assessment of
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the financial impact of a spin-off of EMC’s shares in VMware and also reviewed the status of next steps and further analysis with respect to a potential transaction with Company X.
After several weeks of unsuccessful negotiations regarding the terms of a draft confidentiality and standstill agreement, on October 8, 2014, Elliott Management sent, on behalf of the Elliott Parties, a public letter to the EMC board of directors expressing Elliott’s view that EMC’s Federation structure obscured value in EMC’s business and assets. The letter set forth Elliott’s proposal that EMC increase shareholder value by spinning off its interest in VMware to EMC shareholders, undertaking a leveraged repurchase of EMC shares and pursuing additional strategic alternatives, including the possible sale of assets or of EMC as a whole to one or more strategic counterparties. Following receipt of the public letter and through the remainder of 2014, representatives of EMC and Elliott continued to engage in discussions regarding possible strategic alternatives and continued to negotiate, with the assistance of their respective legal counsel, the terms of a draft confidentiality and standstill agreement. Also during this period, representatives of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee of the EMC board of directors informed representatives of Elliott that the committee was then conducting, with the assistance of an outside consultant, a search for potential director candidates, and that if Elliott had any suggested candidates it wished to be considered, Elliott should submit a list of those names to the committee.
On October 15, 2014, Egon Durban, Managing Partner and Managing Director of Silver Lake Partners and a director of Denali, contacted a representative of EMC’s senior management team by telephone to discuss a potential transaction between the parties. On October 28, 2014, Mr. Durban met with a representative of EMC’s senior management team to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On October 29, 2014, EMC entered into a non-disclosure agreement with Dell and Silver Lake Management Company IV, L.L.C. pursuant to which the parties agreed to keep confidential certain information disclosed by them, in the event any information were to be disclosed, and to use such information solely for the purposes of evaluating a potential transaction between Dell and EMC. The non-disclosure agreement included certain customary standstill restrictions on Dell, Silver Lake Management Company IV, L.L.C and certain of their respective affiliates, which restrictions have since expired.
At a meeting of the EMC board of directors held on November 4-5, 2014, the board discussed with members of EMC’s management, among other topics, the alternatives of enhancement to the Federation model versus spinning off EMC’s shares in VMware to EMC shareholders. McKinsey & Co., referred to as McKinsey, which had previously been engaged by EMC with respect to various other matters, participated in discussion at this meeting concerning strategic matters and action plans arising out of the meeting held on October 6, 2014 (noting that discussions with Company X had terminated in mid-October 2014), a review of the current benefits of the Federation model and potential enhancements and improvements to such model and related benefits and risks.
On November 7, 2014 and November 11, 2014, Mr. Durban met with and contacted representatives of EMC’s senior management team to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On November 14, 2014, Mr. Dell contacted Mr. Tucci by telephone to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On December 4, 2014, a representative of Silver Lake Partners met with a representative of EMC’s senior management team to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
At a meeting of the EMC board of directors held on December 10, 2014, the board discussed with members of EMC’s management the strategic direction of EMC, including the relative challenges and rewards of enhancing the Federation model versus spinning off EMC’s shares in VMware to EMC shareholders. The board also received an update regarding the status of discussions with Elliott, including consideration of a potential candidate identified by Elliott for appointment to the EMC board of directors and a proposed confidentiality and
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standstill agreement under discussion between EMC and Elliott. Though no definitive decision was reached at the meeting, the board’s collective view was that a spin-off of VMware common stock should be further explored. The board also determined that EMC should continue discussions with Elliott regarding director nominees and the confidentiality and standstill agreement, with the belief that reaching agreement on those issues might provide additional time for further consideration of various strategic alternatives.
On January 10, 2015, the EMC board of directors held a telephonic meeting during which the board discussed timing for further evaluation of Federation options, including execution of EMC’s 2015 operating plan and a potential spin-off of EMC’s shares of VMware. The board also received an update regarding negotiations of a draft confidentiality and standstill agreement with Elliott. The draft agreement provided, among other things, that the EMC board of directors would appoint Jose E. Almeida, a director nominee identified and proposed by EMC during negotiations between the parties, and Donald J. Carty, a director nominee identified and proposed by Elliott during negotiations between the parties who was determined by the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee of the EMC board of directors, following the committee’s interview and review process, to meet the committee’s search criteria, to the EMC board of directors and nominate these individuals for re-election at EMC’s 2015 annual meeting of shareholders. The draft agreement also required the Elliott Parties to vote in favor of EMC’s slate of directors at the 2015 annual meeting of shareholders and to abide by customary standstill restrictions lasting through September 1, 2015. The EMC board of directors evaluated Mr. Almeida’s and Mr. Carty’s qualifications, prior experience, potential conflicts of interest and such other matters as the EMC board of directors deemed appropriate to consider with respect to the appointment of an independent director and, contingent upon finalizing the agreement, the EMC board of directors voted to approve an increase in the size of the board to thirteen and to appoint Messrs. Almeida and Carty to the board to serve until the 2015 annual meeting of shareholders. Following the appointment of Messrs. Almeida and Carty to the EMC board of directors, the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee of the EMC board of directors continued its search for an additional potential director candidate meeting its search criteria.
Following the meeting of the EMC board of directors, EMC entered into a confidentiality and standstill agreement with the Elliott Parties, dated January 10, 2015, on the terms and conditions discussed at the meeting of the board.
On January 23, 2015, Mr. Durban met with a representative of EMC’s senior management team to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
In late January 2015, Mr. Dell and Mr. Tucci met while attending the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. During this meeting, Mr. Dell and Mr. Tucci further discussed the possibility of a transaction between EMC and Denali. Shortly thereafter, on February 4, 2015, Mr. Tucci, along with another member of EMC’s management team, met with Mr. Durban to discuss a possible transaction between the parties, including the possibility of an acquisition of EMC by Denali.
On February 24, 2015, David Strohm, in his capacity as Lead Director of EMC, met with Jesse Cohn, a Portfolio Manager of Elliott Management, in Menlo Park, California to further discuss Elliott’s perspectives on how to enhance shareholder value.
On February 26, 2015 and February 27, 2015, the EMC board of directors met with members of EMC management at the offices of VMware in Palo Alto, California. At the meeting, members of management discussed with the board recently reported financial results for EMC for the fourth quarter of 2014 and reviewed EMC’s consolidated financial plan for 2015. Management discussed the challenges EMC could expect to encounter to achieve its consolidated financial plan for 2015 given market trends and the need for EMC to continue to focus its product development efforts on new and emerging technologies, including hybrid cloud technologies. During this discussion, members of senior management reviewed with the board the competitive environment and possible acquisition opportunities that could arise in 2015. Following further review and discussion of the competitive landscape, market trends, EMC’s results of operations for 2014 and its financial plan for 2015, the board of directors was generally of the view that while EMC should pursue decisive steps in 2015, a spin-off of EMC’s shares in VMware was not a preferable option given the benefits of the current
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Federation relationship and efforts directed to research and development, acquisitions of companies of strategic interest and overall Federation enhancement would be more beneficial than continued assessment of a spin-off transaction. At the meeting, Mr. Tucci also provided the board of directors with an update regarding recent discussions with representatives of Elliott, and Mr. Strohm summarized his recent meeting with Mr. Cohn of Elliott Management. Also, in connection with its annual review of the company’s leadership and governance structure, the board of directors, with the non-independent directors and director William Green abstaining, voted that, effective immediately, Mr. Green should serve as the Lead Director of the company.
On March 16, 2015, March 26, 2015 and March 30, 2015, representatives of Silver Lake Partners met with and contacted representatives of EMC’s senior management team to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On April 2, 2015, Mr. Durban met with a representative of EMC’s senior management team to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On April 3, 2015, Messrs. Tucci and Green, along with another member of EMC’s senior management team, met with Mr. Dell and Mr. Durban in Austin, Texas to discuss a potential acquisition of EMC by Denali. During this meeting, the parties discussed, among other matters, Denali’s possible conceptual transaction structures and financing for an acquisition.
Following the April 3, 2015 meeting, the EMC board of directors received a letter from Denali, dated April 9, 2015, setting forth its interest in continuing to evaluate a potential acquisition of 100% of EMC’s core business, excluding VMware, for cash consideration, referred to as the April 9 Letter. The letter did not include a specific offer price but indicated that, based on preliminary due diligence, the amount of consideration that Denali would be willing to pay would represent a substantial premium over the value implied by EMC’s and VMware’s then current public share trading prices. Additionally, Denali conveyed in the letter its strong interest in continuing to evaluate as part of any such transaction the acquisition by it of a meaningful portion of EMC’s economic interest in VMware. The April 9 Letter indicated that Denali anticipated that any acquisition of EMC’s core business would be financed through a combination of new cash equity from Michael S. Dell, MSD Partners, Silver Lake and potentially Silver Lake’s limited partners or other co-investors, excess cash on hand at EMC and Denali and new debt financing from third-party financing sources, with any acquisition of EMC’s VMware shares also financed with a combination of new equity and debt capital.
On April 12, 2015, the EMC board of directors met telephonically to discuss with management, among other matters, the April 9 Letter. During this meeting, a member of EMC’s senior management team summarized for the board the April 3, 2015 meeting between representatives of EMC and Denali and discussed Denali’s interest in an acquisition of EMC. After further discussion of Denali’s expression of interest, the EMC board of directors requested that Mr. Tucci inform Denali that the board had received and discussed its letter. The EMC board of directors reserved for further discussion the topic of a potential transaction with Denali if and as the board deemed such discussion useful for the purpose of building shareholder value. At the meeting, a representative of Skadden also reviewed with the board its fiduciary duties in connection with receipt of the April 9 Letter. Additionally, in connection with EMC’s plan to enhance the Federation model by creating a managed cloud services business, the board reviewed and discussed with management, and approved a letter of intent with respect to, a potential acquisition by EMC of Virtustream Group Holdings, Inc., referred to as Virtustream, a cloud software and services company.
During the remainder of April 2015 and throughout May 2015, representatives of Denali, including its legal counsel, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, referred to as Simpson Thacher, and its accounting and tax advisor, Deloitte & Touche LLP, referred to as Deloitte, conducted a preliminary tax due diligence review of EMC for the purposes of considering various transaction structures for the potential transaction. This review generally consisted of meetings and calls between the parties’ respective tax advisors, management teams and legal counsel. Also during this period, McKinsey began preparing, with the help of EMC’s management team, an
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analysis of the potential synergies of a transaction with Denali and an analysis of certain “Federation 2.X” enhancements. During this period, following director review of a number of potential financial advisory candidates, Mr. Green, with coordination and assistance from members of EMC’s management team, also interviewed a number of financial advisors, including Morgan Stanley and Evercore, to act as financial advisors to the EMC board of directors in its review of strategic alternatives.
On April 30, 2015, the EMC board of directors met in Hopkinton, Massachusetts to discuss, among other matters, recent communications with Elliott. At the meeting, the board received and discussed a copy of a letter addressed to the board, dated April 29, 2015, which was sent by Mr. Cohn on behalf of Elliott Management. In the letter, Elliott Management called on the board to take significant and prompt action to maximize EMC’s value and requested a meeting between representatives of Elliott Management and a relevant group of EMC’s directors, including Mr. Tucci. Mr. Tucci confirmed for the board that, in response to Elliott Management’s letter, he along with one or more members of the board would be meeting with representatives of Elliott Management in the upcoming weeks. The board of directors also discussed with management the competitive forces affecting EMC’s business, including cloud service offerings and initiatives of various competitors. In connection with this discussion, the board of directors received an update from management regarding ongoing negotiations with respect to the company’s proposed acquisition of Virtustream.
On May 5, 2015, Mr. Durban met with a representative of EMC’s senior management team to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On May 21, 2015, representatives of Silver Lake Partners contacted a representative of EMC’s senior management team by telephone to discuss certain tax matters related to a potential transaction between the parties.
On May 22, 2015, EMC entered into a merger agreement to acquire Virtustream.
On June 2, 2015, Messrs. Tucci and Green, along with other members of the EMC board of directors and senior management, met with Mr. Cohn and other representatives of Elliott Management at EMC’s headquarters in Hopkinton, Massachusetts. The representatives of EMC and Elliott Management discussed Elliott Management’s concerns reflected in its April 29, 2015 letter, Elliott Management’s views regarding potential strategic alternatives available to EMC that could possibly enhance shareholder value and recent initiatives undertaken by EMC to add value, including the pending acquisition of Virtustream.
On June 3, 2015, the non-management directors of the EMC board held a telephonic meeting at which Mr. Green provided the directors with a summary of the June 2, 2015 meeting with representatives of Elliott Management and reviewed an agenda for a call with members of senior management scheduled to occur immediately following the conclusion of the board meeting to discuss the status of the company’s review of strategic alternatives. During this later call, members of senior management reviewed: (1) the status of engaging Morgan Stanley and Evercore as financial advisors to assist the company and the board in their assessment of strategic alternatives; (2) the strategic alternatives then being evaluated by senior management, including various “Federation 2.X” enhancements (including acquisitions of companies of strategic interest, a leveraged recapitalization transaction and continued share buy-backs), a potential sale of the company to Denali and the possibility of investigating whether there might be an opportunity with respect to a potential transaction with Company Y, a global provider of servers, storage and networking solutions; (3) strategies to create a managed cloud services business within the Federation, including through the pending acquisition of Virtustream; and (4) additional considerations, beyond strategic and financial concerns, regarding the various strategic alternatives being considered, including the impact of these alternatives on customers, partners and employees of EMC. During this call, members of senior management also presented a process update with respect to a potential transaction with Denali, including a potential meeting to occur in the coming days between certain members of the EMC board and senior management with representatives of Denali, and a preliminary analysis of the estimated cost and revenue synergies of a potential transaction.
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On June 8, 2015, Messrs. Dell and Durban met with a member of the EMC board of directors and a representative of EMC’s senior management team in Boston, Massachusetts to discuss the potential merits and terms of a transaction between the parties and to obtain additional background information regarding Denali’s operations and its strategic vision.
On June 9, 2015, EMC entered into a letter agreement with Morgan Stanley, engaging Morgan Stanley to act as a financial advisor to the EMC board of directors with respect to EMC’s evaluation of various strategic alternatives for the company. The letter agreement provided for Morgan Stanley to receive a monthly advisory fee during the term of the agreement but did not require EMC to engage Morgan Stanley as a financial advisor in connection with a potential sale transaction or entitle Morgan Stanley to receive a fee if a sale transaction were consummated.
Also on June 9, 2015, Messrs. Tucci and Green, along with a member of EMC’s senior management team, met with Messrs. Dell and Durban in Boston, Massachusetts, to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties, including the parties’ respective strategic visions of how a combined Denali-EMC organization would operate following the closing of any such transaction, and to review certain preliminary due diligence questions posed by Denali regarding EMC’s business and operations.
On June 15, 2015, the EMC board of directors held a telephonic meeting at which representatives of Morgan Stanley provided the board with Morgan Stanley’s preliminary assessment of several strategic alternatives which might be available to EMC to potentially enhance shareholder value. These alternatives included several standalone strategies, including a levered recapitalization of EMC, the issuance by EMC of a tracking stock that would track EMC’s economic interest in VMware, the buy-in of VMware’s publicly-held shares and a spin-off of VMware, as well as actions involving third parties, including a sale of EMC to a third party and acquisitions of companies of strategic interest. Morgan Stanley also reviewed and discussed with the board of directors financial forecasts for EMC’s core businesses prepared by management and presented its preliminary assessment of the potential future prices of EMC stock under various assumptions. Representatives of Evercore also presented Evercore’s independent preliminary view of industry and market dynamics and discussed several alternative strategies EMC could potentially pursue that might positively impact EMC’s revenue and earnings per share, including a levered recapitalization transaction and acquisitions of companies of strategic interest. Certain members of management, together with a representative of McKinsey, delivered a presentation discussing EMC’s Federation strategy and the status and progress of various “Federation 2.X” enhancements to this strategy. Certain members of management also presented an update on EMC’s long-range planning, including reviewing multi-year forecasts prepared by management under varied assumptions, and a representative of Skadden discussed with EMC’s board of directors its fiduciary duties with respect to its review of the various strategic alternatives potentially available to EMC. The EMC board of directors, together with representatives of Morgan Stanley, Evercore and members of management, engaged in a discussion of certain potential benefits associated with the various potential strategic alternatives discussed, as well as certain concerns and considerations related to the various strategic alternatives. Among the concerns or considerations noted were: with respect to a levered recapitalization of EMC, the sustainability of any price impact following share repurchases, the impact of a higher debt load and lower credit rating for EMC’s business, and that this alternative might preclude future large business investments or acquisitions; with respect to the issuance by EMC of a tracking stock to track EMC’s economic interest in VMware, the potential complexity from having another publicly traded security representing an interest in VMware, possible financial reporting issues, the continuing need to maintain ownership of 80% of outstanding VMware shares to continue to include VMware in its consolidated tax returns, and that this alternative appeared to present only a modest opportunity to EMC to unlock near-term value; with respect to a sale of EMC to a third party strategic buyer, the limited universe of potential buyer candidates, the challenging deal size for any potential buyer, and the potential impact of exogenous distractions on likely buyer candidates; with respect to a take-private transaction, the complexity of such a transaction, the absence of potential synergies to be realized in a transaction with a financial buyer, the limited universe of potential financial buyer candidates, the significant debt financing that would be required for a financial buyer and the limited range of exit opportunities that would be available to a financial buyer; with
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respect to a possible buy-in of outstanding VMware shares, the likely premium required to effectuate the buy-in, the uncertain valuation of EMC common stock post buy-in, and the effect of the loss of an employee hiring and retention tool; with respect to a spin-off of VMware, the loss of full operational alignment, the potential for material dis-synergies on both revenue and earnings and questions about the future of a separate storage entity; and with respect to acquisitions of strategic interest, potential tax issues and timing, the availability and willingness of potential acquisition targets, the need to pay a transaction premium, potential dilution and execution risks in consummating such acquisitions. Mr. Tucci provided the board of directors with an update on a recent meeting between representatives of EMC and Denali to discuss a potential sale transaction, and another member of the board discussed his recent separate meeting with a representative of Denali. EMC’s non-management directors engaged in a discussion of the structural alternatives and “Federation 2.X” enhancements presented during the meeting and the option of further engaging with Denali regarding a potential transaction in light of the concerns identified with respect to various strategic alternatives. Following this discussion, the directors established a protocol for further discussions with Denali, pursuant to which Mr. Green, with the advice of EMC’s financial advisors and the assistance of other non-management directors of EMC, would lead consideration of whether and how to further engage in discussions with Denali regarding a potential transaction.
Following the June 15, 2015 meeting of the EMC board of directors and through September 2015, members of EMC’s senior management team and its legal and financial advisors engaged in a number of discussions with respect to, and conducted research and analysis of, several standalone strategies that EMC could pursue to potentially enhance shareholder value, including the issuance by EMC of a tracking stock that would track EMC’s economic interest in VMware, and also reviewed certain key terms and conditions that EMC would expect to see reflected in a draft merger agreement for a potential transaction with Denali.
On June 25, 2015, representatives of Silver Lake Partners contacted a representative of EMC’s senior management team by telephone to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On June 26, 2015, EMC entered into a letter agreement with Needham & Company, LLC, referred to as Needham, to engage Needham as a financial advisor to EMC in connection with a possible transaction. In connection with this engagement, Needham reviewed and summarized publicly available financial and market data, including with respect to Denali and Dell, for use by management of EMC in evaluating a possible transaction.
On July 1, 2015, representatives of Silver Lake Partners contacted a representative of EMC’s senior management team by telephone to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On July 7, 2015, Mr. Tucci and Mr. Dell participated in a call to further discuss the status of a potential transaction.
On July 9, 2015, the closing of the Virtustream transaction occurred, pursuant to which Virtustream became a wholly-owned subsidiary of EMC.
On July 15, 2015, the EMC board of directors received a letter, dated July 13, 2015, from Denali setting forth its non-binding indication of interest regarding an acquisition of 100% of EMC’s core federated businesses and EMC’s shareholdings in VMware in a transaction that would deliver to EMC shareholders $33.05 per share of total value to EMC shareholders, referred to as the July 15 Letter. Per the July 15 Letter, the proposed per share consideration would consist of $24.69 per share in cash and $8.36 per share in non-voting tracking stock, which tracking stock would be linked to up to 60% of EMC’s economic interest in VMware. The July 15 Letter stated that the $33.05 proposal represented a premium to the implied enterprise value of EMC’s core federated businesses (excluding VMware) based on trading prices of EMC common stock and VMware Class A common stock as of July 10, 2015, as well as a premium to EMC’s one-, two- and five-year trading highs, and that for purposes of Denali’s analysis, Denali valued the economic interest represented by the tracking stock at the then-current public market price of the underlying VMware shares. The July 15 Letter also set forth certain terms that Denali expected would be included in a definitive merger agreement for the transaction, including a go-shop period of unspecified duration during which EMC would be permitted to solicit alternative acquisition proposals
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and to enter into such a proposal if superior to the transaction agreed to by EMC and Denali, subject to EMC paying Denali an unspecified termination fee. The July 15 Letter set forth Denali’s view that debt financing for the transaction could be readily obtained, enclosed a letter, dated July 13, 2015, from J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, referred to as JP Morgan, expressing JP Morgan’s confidence in underwriting a significant amount of Denali’s debt financing and provided additional detail regarding the proposed equity financing for the transaction. The July 15 Letter also indicated that EMC would have the ability to specifically enforce Denali’s obligation to close the transaction if Denali’s closing conditions are satisfied and the necessary debt financing were to be funded, and that a substantial reverse termination fee would be included in the event the merger agreement were terminated because of Denali’s breach or because Denali fails to close because its third-party debt financing is not available. The financing structure outlined in the July 15 Letter assumed that Denali would raise $14 to 16 billion in new common and preferred equity from Michael S. Dell, MSD Partners, Silver Lake and potentially Silver Lake’s limited partners.
On July 16, 2015, the EMC board of directors met in Boston, Massachusetts to discuss, among other matters, the July 15 Letter with management and EMC’s financial advisors. Representatives of Morgan Stanley, which had been provided a version of the July 15 Letter which had the identity of Denali redacted, provided its assessment of Denali’s proposal. The EMC board of directors discussed this assessment and Denali’s proposal in detail with the representatives of Morgan Stanley, including in the context of EMC’s ongoing assessments of strategic alternatives for the company. The non-management directors agreed that a sale of EMC might be attractive and in the best interests of EMC’s shareholders, but that an increase in the proposed consideration should be pursued. The non-management directors instructed Mr. Green, as the board’s representative, to inform Denali that the consideration proposed in the July 15 Letter was inadequate, while at the same time communicating the board’s desire for additional information regarding Denali’s indication of interest. The non-management directors also authorized Mr. Green to further engage Morgan Stanley to advise the board regarding a possible transaction with Denali and with respect to alternative strategies to enhance shareholder value. A representative of Skadden advised the board of directors regarding their fiduciary duties under Massachusetts law in light of their receipt of the July 15 Letter. During the meeting, certain members of management also reviewed with the board of directors EMC’s second quarter financial results, noting management’s expectation that it would reduce its internal forecast of full-year product bookings for the company and would discuss this information in the upcoming earnings call with investors.
On July 21, 2015, representatives of Silver Lake Partners contacted a representative of EMC’s senior management team by telephone to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On July 22, 2015, members of EMC’s management team held a conference call with investors to discuss EMC’s second quarter financial results and full year outlook. During this call, members of EMC’s management team discussed the company’s decision to reduce its full year revenue forecast by $400 million, identifying as relevant factors a decline in customer demand for traditional storage products, pressure in certain international markets due to geopolitical issues and its general cost structure.
On July 23, 2015, Messrs. Tucci and Green received an email from Mr. Cohn for circulation to the other members of the EMC board of directors. In the email, Mr. Cohn expressed Elliott Management’s disappointment with EMC’s second quarter financial results and stated that, upon termination of the standstill restrictions on September 1, 2015, Elliott Management intended to appeal directly to EMC’s shareholders for change.
As discussed during the July 16, 2015 meeting of the EMC board of directors, on July 27, 2015, Mr. Green contacted Mr. Dell by telephone to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties. During the call, Mr. Green noted that the EMC board of directors had reviewed and discussed the July 15 Letter and had determined that further discussions should take place between the parties to develop a better understanding of Denali’s proposal and to further assess the possibility of a transaction. Mr. Green also conveyed to Mr. Dell the EMC board of directors’ position that the consideration referenced in the July 15 Letter did not reflect EMC’s full value, noting that while the proposed consideration reflected a premium to the then current trading price of EMC shares, the board of directors’ position was that EMC’s recent investments and growth opportunities were
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not fully reflected in the company’s then current market price. Mr. Green also discussed the tracking stock component of the consideration referenced in the July 15 Letter, noting that it would be a key element in the evaluation by EMC shareholders of Denali’s proposal, and expressed a need for additional information regarding both the tracking stock and the scope and terms of Denali’s financing for the proposed transaction.
On July 28, 2015, representatives of Silver Lake Partners contacted a representative of EMC’s senior management team and a representative of Morgan Stanley by telephone to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On July 29, 2015, the EMC board of directors met with representatives of EMC’s management and Morgan Stanley in Boston, Massachusetts. At the meeting, a representative of Morgan Stanley discussed Morgan Stanley’s assessment, including the valuation implications thereof, of certain standalone “Federation 2.X” strategies that EMC could pursue, including a leveraged recapitalization of EMC and the issuance by EMC of a tracking stock linked to EMC’s interest in VMware, and compared these alternatives to several other strategies involving third parties, including a strategic sale of EMC and the sale of certain non-core businesses. The EMC board of directors discussed these alternatives in detail, including the concerns and considerations associated with these alternatives previously identified. The board of directors also discussed next steps for engaging with Denali regarding a potential transaction, including the need for greater certainty regarding Denali’s ability to obtain necessary financing. Mr. Green also provided the board with a summary of his July 27, 2015 call with Mr. Dell. After further discussion, the EMC board of directors determined that the various standalone strategies discussed with Morgan Stanley at the meeting should be developed and considered in parallel with further discussions with Denali regarding a potential transaction.
On July 30, 2015, a meeting of the EMC board of directors was held in Boston, Massachusetts to discuss, among other matters, the principal terms of a proposed engagement letter with Morgan Stanley providing for Morgan Stanley to act as a financial advisor to the board with respect to the evaluation of strategic alternatives. Following the board’s discussion of the terms of the proposed engagement letter, the board directed Mr. Green to finalize and execute the engagement letter. Members of Virtustream’s management team also presented an overview of the Virtustream business and the opportunities it could provide the Federation in connection with the creation of a managed cloud services business.
On July 31, 2015, representatives of Silver Lake Partners contacted a representative of EMC’s senior management team by telephone to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
In August 2015, after the board’s consideration of Morgan Stanley’s qualifications, expertise, reputation, relationships and knowledge of EMC’s business, and negotiations as to the terms of its engagement, EMC entered into a letter agreement, dated August 5, 2015, confirming EMC’s engagement of Morgan Stanley as of May 24, 2015 to act as a financial advisor to the EMC board of directors in connection with EMC’s evaluation of strategic alternatives for the company, including a possible sale of EMC as a whole. Pursuant to the letter agreement, in addition to a monthly advisory fee, Morgan Stanley was entitled to receive a fee if EMC consummated a sale transaction.
On August 3, 2015, representatives of Silver Lake Partners contacted a representative of EMC’s senior management team by telephone to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On August 6, 2015, an organizational call was held between representatives of Bain & Company, Inc., referred to as Bain, consultants to Denali, and McKinsey, consultants to EMC, to discuss various business and financial due diligence related matters, including the creation of a data room and the establishment of a “clean room” protocol for antitrust and competition purposes. Thereafter and continuing throughout the period leading to the execution of the merger agreement, members of Denali’s management team, representatives of Silver Lake Partners and Denali’s advisors conducted a financial and business due diligence investigation of EMC with the assistance of antitrust counsel to both parties. Denali’s financial and business due diligence investigation of EMC generally consisted of, among other things, EMC providing Denali’s management team, representatives of Silver
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Lake Partners and Denali’s financial advisors with financial and other documents related to its business and operations and numerous meetings between the parties’ respective management teams, representatives and advisors.
On August 7, 2015, representatives of Silver Lake Partners met with a representative of EMC’s senior management team to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On August 18, 2015, a representative of Silver Lake Partners contacted a representative of EMC’s senior management team by telephone to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On August 18, 2015, during a telephonic meeting of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee of the EMC board of directors, the committee authorized another independent director of the EMC board to assist Mr. Green in his communications with both Denali and Elliott and to serve as a liaison to the committee with respect to such communications.
The following day, on August 19, 2015, the EMC board of directors met telephonically with members of EMC’s management and representatives of Morgan Stanley and Skadden to further discuss, among other matters, certain standalone strategies that could be pursued by EMC to potentially enhance shareholder value. At the meeting, representatives of Morgan Stanley provided to the EMC board of directors its views with respect to two such strategies – the issuance by EMC of a tracking stock reflecting EMC’s economic interest in VMware and a leveraged recapitalization of EMC – which the directors discussed in detail, noting the issues previously identified with respect to these alternatives continued to be of concern. Morgan Stanley reviewed with the EMC board of directors the terms of certain precedent tracking stocks, noting the potential advantage that a tracking stock linked to EMC’s interest in VMware would be well understood given the existing VMware Class A common stock, as well as potential disadvantages, including accounting, legal and corporate complexity, a limitation of EMC’s ability to access VMware’s cash flows, and that such distribution would reduce the market capitalization of EMC common stock. A representative of Skadden also provided the directors with advice with respect to certain legal considerations related to the issuance of tracking stock. At the meeting, a member of EMC’s management team reviewed with the board of directors the data room and related protocols established for Denali and its representatives to continue its financial and business due diligence investigation of the company, which protocols were formulated through discussions with EMC’s advisors and representatives of Denali.
In connection with finalizing a “clean room” protocol, on August 21, 2015, EMC, Dell, Bain and McKinsey & Company, Inc. United States entered into a non-disclosure agreement related to the exchange of confidential information among designated representatives of EMC and Dell and a clean team non-disclosure agreement related to the exchange of competitively sensitive information among designated representatives of EMC and Dell.
On August 27, 2015, Messrs. Green and Tucci and a representative of EMC’s senior management team met with Messrs. Dell and Durban to further discuss a potential transaction between the parties.
On August 28, 2015, members of EMC’s senior management, together with Mr. Green and another member of the EMC board of directors, met with representatives of Silver Lake Partners and representatives of JP Morgan, Denali’s financial advisor, in Morristown, New Jersey. At the meeting, EMC’s senior management provided the representatives of Silver Lake Partners and the representatives of JP Morgan with additional information regarding EMC’s business, operations and financial position, and the representatives of Silver Lake Partners and the representatives of JP Morgan provided EMC’s senior management with additional information regarding the terms of Denali’s proposed debt financing.
On September 1, 2015, Messrs. Green and Tucci received a letter from Denali addressed to the EMC board of directors, dated September 1, 2015, referred to as the September 1 Letter. The September 1 Letter set forth Denali’s revised non-binding indication of interest to acquire 100% of EMC’s core federated businesses and
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EMC’s shareholdings in VMware for cash consideration and non-voting tracking stock. The September 1 Letter reconfirmed Denali’s overall per share consideration price set forth in the July 15 Letter of $33.05 per share, but modified the allocation of this consideration between cash and tracking stock so as to consist of $24.92 per share in cash and $8.13 per share in tracking stock. Denali’s revised indication of interest also provided that the tracking stock would be linked to up to 60-70% of EMC’s economic interest in VMware, an increase from the 60% interest referenced in the July 15 Letter, and that for purposes of Denali’s analysis, that Denali was valuing the economic interest represented by the tracking stock at the then-current public market price of the underlying VMware shares. The September 1 Letter stated that the $33.05 proposal represented a premium to the implied enterprise value of EMC’s core federated businesses (excluding VMware) based on trading prices of EMC common stock and VMware Class A common stock as of September 1, 2015, as well as a premium to EMC’s one-, two- and five-year trading highs. The revised indication of interest also set forth Denali’s view that EMC’s shareholders would receive additional value, not reflected in the $33.05 proposal, through their ownership of the tracking stock and the synergies Denali expected VMware would realize as a result of the transaction. The September 1 Letter noted Denali’s intent to continue to invest heavily in the Boston area community and corporate presence and its belief that the enhanced prospects of a combined Dell-EMC would provide retained EMC employees and executives with greater financial and other opportunities than a standalone EMC. The September 1 Letter also reiterated Denali’s confidence in obtaining debt financing for the transaction, provided additional information regarding the nature and timing of its proposed financing, and enclosed letters from JP Morgan, dated September 1, 2015, regarding JP Morgan’s continued confidence in underwriting Denali’s debt financing and its prior favorable financing experiences with Dell and Silver Lake Partners. The financing structure outlined in the September 1 Letter assumed that Denali would raise $6 to 11 billion of preferred equity from unspecified existing limited partners of Silver Lake and $3 to 8 billion of new equity from Michael S. Dell, MSD Partners, Silver Lake and co-investors.
On September 2, 2015, a meeting of the EMC board of directors was held in New York City, at which members of EMC’s management provided the directors with additional information regarding a number of “Federation 2.X” alternatives the company could potentially pursue. The directors compared these alternatives to various other potential strategic options, including a potential transaction with Denali and additional strategic acquisitions of companies of interest. EMC’s management also presented data concerning potential aspects of a transaction with Denali, including potential cost and revenue synergies. Representatives of Morgan Stanley provided a market update, including its assessment of current capital market conditions and certain market observations regarding EMC’s performance relative to its industry peers, reviewed the financial forecasts for EMC and its valuation analysis of EMC as a standalone company, provided additional financial analysis of a possible recapitalization transaction through the issuance by EMC of a standalone tracking stock and provided an update on the ongoing negotiations of a potential transaction with Denali. The EMC board of directors engaged in a lengthy discussion of the matters presented by management and Morgan Stanley, as well as the September 1 Letter, which was circulated to the directors. The discussion addressed, among other topics, the comparative strategic merits, execution risks and stakeholder considerations of the “Federation 2.X” alternatives presented and of a potential transaction with Denali, as well as timing considerations applicable to each. With respect to the “Federation 2.X” alternatives, the directors considered as potential strategic merits the anticipated continued customer support of Federation strategies, the possibility of EMC realizing additional synergies from consolidation transactions and the availability of capital for strategic acquisitions, and as potential risks the uncertainties as to the anticipated growth rates of certain EMC businesses, EMC’s size relative to other large information technology companies, possible limited opportunities for strategic partnerships and the culture challenges of strengthening Federation governance and a CEO transition. With respect to a potential transaction with Denali, in addition to the anticipated value of the merger consideration, the directors considered as possible strategic merits the potential position of the combined company as an information technology leader and possible cross-selling opportunities, and as potential risks the uncertainties and impact on EMC’s business that could result from possible other bids for EMC, as well as the possible impact on EMC stakeholders, including employees and the local economy, that might result from any workforce reductions implemented by the surviving company. Following this discussion, Messrs. Dell and Durban and a representative of JP Morgan joined the meeting. Mr. Dell discussed with the board of directors the opportunities that could be created by, and benefits
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of, combining Denali’s and EMC’s respective operations and, along with Mr. Durban and the representative of JP Morgan, provided additional details regarding Denali’s proposed financing. Messrs. Dell and Durban also answered a number of questions from the EMC board of directors regarding the effect of the proposed transaction on EMC’s employees and other Massachusetts constituencies. Following the departure of Messrs. Dell and Durban and the representative of JP Morgan, the directors continued to discuss the potential transaction with Denali, including the timing and risks of such a transaction, and various “Federation 2.X” alternatives and the possible benefits and risks of these alternatives as discussed in prior meetings of the EMC board of directors. From this discussion, the non-management directors concluded that they needed additional information to better understand the potential risks and rewards associated with Denali’s proposal, including the proposed issuance of tracking stock. At the meeting, the EMC board of directors also unanimously approved the creation of a special committee of the board to consider certain matters related to the creation of a managed cloud services business.
On September 4, 2015, Mr. Durban met with a representative of VMware’s senior management to discuss the potential transaction between EMC and Denali.
On September 8, 2015, during a telephonic meeting of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee of the EMC board of directors, which certain other members of the EMC board also attended, the directors discussed Temasek as a possible preferred equity financing source proposed by Denali in connection with a potential transaction.
On September 14, 2015, Denali provided representatives of EMC a summary of key terms that Denali proposed be included in a merger agreement for the transaction. Among other matters, Denali’s summary proposed a thirty-day go-shop period, an eighteen-month “tail” period for any EMC termination fee payable due to entry into or consummation of an alternative transaction following termination of the merger agreement, and a closing condition for the benefit of Denali imposing a limit on the percentage of EMC shareholders seeking to assert appraisal rights in respect of the transaction.
The next day, on September 15, 2015, a member of EMC’s senior management team and a representative of Morgan Stanley met in-person in Menlo Park, California with representatives of Silver Lake Partners to discuss the summary of key terms proposed by Denali.
Also on September 15, 2015, the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee of the EMC board of directors met telephonically, along with another member of the EMC board of directors, to discuss, among other matters, the status of certain “Federation 2.X” enhancements and initiatives undertaken by the company and discussions and work related to a potential transaction with Denali. At the meeting, Mr. Green indicated that he would be participating in an upcoming discussion with representatives of Denali to further review a potential transaction and that he, Mr. Tucci and other representatives of EMC would also be separately meeting with representatives of Elliott Management.
In mid-September 2015, Mr. Green attended a meeting with representatives of Denali. At the meeting, the parties discussed certain proposed terms for a transaction.
On September 17, 2015, Messrs. Green and Tucci, along with another independent director of the EMC board of directors and a member of EMC’s senior management team, met with representatives of Elliott Management in New York City. At the meeting, the representatives of EMC and Elliott Management discussed, among other matters, Elliott Management’s perspectives on steps EMC could take to enhance shareholder value, reviewed recent value-creating initiatives undertaken by EMC and various other strategic alternatives being considered by EMC and discussed the possibility of the parties entering into another non-disclosure agreement.
On September 18, 2015, members of EMC’s senior management team, and representatives of Denali, Silver Lake Partners and Deloitte met to discuss certain tax issues, a proposed requirement that EMC have a minimum amount of cash on hand at closing and related cash repatriation issues in connection with the proposed transaction.
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Also, on September 18, 2015, members of EMC’s senior management team met with representatives of Silver Lake Partners to discuss certain financial matters in connection with the proposed transaction.
On September 18, 2015, Denali provided a draft merger agreement to EMC. Among other provisions, Denali’s draft merger agreement proposed a forty-five day go-shop period, a five business day match right that would continuously reset for another five business days as a result of any amendment to financial or other material terms, an EMC termination fee of $3 billion (reduced to $2 billion with respect to the go-shop period), Denali’s right to uncapped expense reimbursement from EMC if the merger agreement is terminated in certain circumstances, an eighteen-month “tail” period for any EMC termination fee payable, a closing condition for the benefit of Denali related to assertion of appraisal rights by EMC shareholders, a requirement that Denali’s proposed preferred equity financing be available in order for EMC to be entitled to specific performance of Denali’s obligations to consummate the merger, a reverse termination fee of $2 billion, and Delaware governing law and submission to jurisdiction provisions. Denali’s draft merger agreement also contemplated a closing condition solely in favor of Denali related to receipt of a tax opinion from Denali’s counsel that the merger should be treated as an exchange described in Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code and that for U.S. federal income tax purposes, the Class V Common Stock should be considered common stock of Denali.
Through October 12, 2015, EMC, Denali, Silver Lake Partners and their respective legal counsel and financial advisors engaged in negotiations concerning the draft merger agreement and its exhibits and schedules, including, among other items, covenants related to the solicitation of acquisition proposals, the ability of the EMC board of directors to change its recommendation, Denali’s obligations to obtain financing and consummate the transaction, EMC’s rights to specific performance, the parties’ respective termination rights and the size and triggers for termination fees, including a reverse termination fee.
Commencing in mid-September 2015 and continuing throughout the period leading to the execution of the merger agreement, representatives of Denali, including its legal counsel and accounting advisors, and Silver Lake Partners conducted confirmatory legal, tax and accounting due diligence of EMC. In connection with this review, on September 23, 2015, Simpson Thacher provided a list to Morgan Stanley regarding the legal due diligence that Denali wished to perform on EMC. In response to this legal due diligence request list and other requests from Denali and its advisors regarding tax and accounting due diligence, EMC provided Denali and its legal counsel and accounting advisors with a number of documents related to its business and operations and held several calls between the parties’ respective legal counsel and accounting advisors.
On September 21, 2015, representatives of EMC, Denali, Silver Lake Partners, Morgan Stanley, Skadden and Simpson Thacher met in person and by videoconference to discuss proposed terms of the tracking stock to be issued to EMC shareholders in connection with the proposed transaction. During the call, Denali provided a written summary of certain key tracking stock principles proposed by Denali, which the parties discussed during the call. Among other matters, Denali’s summary proposed that the tracking stock be convertible into Denali common stock at any time based on the relative market value of each security at such time, that the tracking stock represent 60% of EMC’s current stake in VMware and that the tracking stock vote together as a single class with Denali’s other stockholders. Denali’s summary also contained provisions related to a proposed capital stock committee of the Denali board, whose initial members were proposed by Denali to be selected in Denali’s sole discretion.
On September 22, 2015, during a telephonic meeting of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee of the EMC board of directors, which certain other members of the EMC board also attended, Mr. Green discussed with the directors the substance of his September 17, 2015 meeting with representatives of Elliott Management and a conversation between him and Mr. Cohn of Elliott Management that occurred shortly following the September 17, 2015 meeting. Also at this meeting, the committee determined to recommend that Laura Sen, having been determined after the committee’s interview and review process to meet its search criteria, be appointed to the EMC board of directors.
Following the meeting of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee of the EMC board of directors, on September 22, 2015, the EMC board of directors met telephonically with certain members of
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EMC’s management team. At the meeting, Mr. Green provided the directors with an update regarding a potential transaction with Denali, including information regarding the work undertaken by Denali to secure financing for the transaction and possible timing of next steps to reach agreement on transaction terms. He also provided the directors with an update regarding the status of certain ongoing work related to “Federation 2.X” initiatives, including with respect to the possible standalone strategy of EMC issuing tracking stock reflecting its economic interest in VMware. The EMC board of directors discussed at length these matters, including the interdependency of efforts related to a potential transaction with Denali, certain “Federation 2.X” initiatives and the creation of a managed cloud services business within the Federation, and agreed on the importance aligning these efforts and director oversight given the interrelatedness of these matters. At this meeting, following an evaluation by the EMC board of directors of Ms. Sen’s qualifications, prior experience, potential conflicts of interest and such other matters as the EMC board of directors deemed appropriate to consider with respect to the appointment of an independent director, the EMC board of directors also unanimously agreed to increase the size of the board to thirteen members and to elect Ms. Sen to the board.
On September 23, 2015, Skadden provided a revised draft of the merger agreement to representatives of Denali and Silver Lake Partners.
Also on September 23, 2015, Messrs. Green and Tucci received a letter from Denali addressed to the EMC board of directors, dated September 23, 2015, referred to as the September 23 Letter. The September 23 Letter set forth Denali’s further revised non-binding indication of interest to acquire 100% of EMC’s core federated businesses, excluding VMware, and EMC’s shareholdings in VMware for cash consideration and tracking stock. The September 23 Letter proposed total consideration per share of $33.05 to $33.15 (valuing the economic interest represented by the tracking stock at the then current market price of the underlying VMware common stock), noting that Denali had increased its per share consideration of its offer despite a decrease in the EMC share price and industry valuation multiples since its first proposal. The September 23 Letter did not indicate what portion of the consideration would consist of cash consideration versus tracking stock, but provided that the tracking stock would be linked to 60% of EMC’s economic interest in VMware. The September 23 Letter stated that the $33.05-$33.15 proposal represented a premium to the implied enterprise value of EMC’s core federated businesses (excluding VMware) based on trading prices of EMC common stock and VMware Class A common stock as of September 22, 2015, as well as a premium over specified mean current trading multiples of a group of EMC’s industry peers. The September 23 Letter also provided additional information regarding the anticipated timing, sources and amounts of its proposed debt and equity financing. Also enclosed with the September 23 Letter were letters from Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, referred to as Merrill Lynch, and JP Morgan, each dated September 22, 2015, expressing the confidence of each of Merrill Lynch and JP Morgan in underwriting Denali’s debt financing, as well as term sheets for the debt and equity financing. The financing structure outlined in the September 23 Letter assumed that Denali would raise up to $7 billion of preferred equity from existing limited partners of Silver Lake and up to $4 billion of new common equity from Michael S. Dell, MSD Partners, Silver Lake and Silver Lake’s and MSD Partners limited partners.
On September 23, 2015, representatives of EMC’s senior management team and representatives of Silver Lake Partners met to further discuss the proposed transaction between the parties.
On September 25, 2015, the EMC board of directors met telephonically with management and representatives of Morgan Stanley and Skadden to discuss, among other matters, the September 23 Letter. At the meeting, representatives of Morgan Stanley provided to the board its assessment of the terms of September 23 Letter, including its valuation analysis of the proposed merger consideration, and discussed Denali’s proposed sources and uses to fund the transaction. During this review, Morgan Stanley also discussed certain standalone “Federation 2.X” strategies EMC could alternatively pursue from the point of view of determining the best strategic alternative for EMC shareholders on a risk-adjusted basis. The representatives of Morgan Stanley also provided a valuation analysis of EMC for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 relative to EMC’s industry peers. A representative of Skadden reviewed with the board of directors certain key open issues under discussion between Denali and EMC regarding the proposed issuance of tracking stock and Denali’s financing for the potential transaction, focusing on issues that
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could potentially impact the estimated value of the tracking stock and deal certainty, and also reviewed with the directors their fiduciary duties under Massachusetts law under the circumstances. The key open issues as to the proposed tracking stock included whether the tracking stock would be convertible into Denali common stock at a premium, whether the tracking stock would have a separate class vote and under what circumstances, and the composition of the Capital Stock Committee of the Denali board of directors. The key open issues as to deal certainty regarding Denali’s financing included whether Denali’s debt commitment letters would be subject to funding conditions related to Denali’s existing business or the combined enterprise, whether Denali’s debt and common equity commitments would be subject to funding conditions related to the availability of Denali’s proposed preferred equity financing, the timing of the marketing period and the size and triggers for the reverse termination fee. Mr. Green provided the directors with an update regarding possible next steps with respect to the proposed transaction with Denali. In executive session, the non-management directors discussed the various presentations by Morgan Stanley and Skadden at length and their respective views of the challenges and risks presented by certain aspects of both Denali’s revised indication of interest and the various alternative standalone “Federation 2.X” strategies and their view that EMC should continue to pursue a possible transaction with Denali.
On September 25, 2015, representatives of EMC’s senior management team, Silver Lake Partners and Bain met to further discuss the proposed transaction between Denali and EMC.
On September 26, 2015, a member of EMC’s senior management team attended a call with Mr. Durban to discuss EMC’s and Denali’s respective positions as to certain key open transaction terms. Among the principal provisions discussed were those relating to the terms of EMC’s right to solicit alternative acquisition proposals during a go-shop period, Denali’s obligations to secure debt and common equity financing sufficient to close the transaction, risks associated with the availability of the proposed preferred stock financing and the amount of the per share merger consideration and the allocation of the consideration between cash and tracking stock.
Following the call between a member of EMC’s senior management team and Mr. Durban, on September 26, 2015, Simpson Thacher circulated to EMC, Morgan Stanley and Skadden a list setting forth principal open business issues identified by Simpson Thacher, Denali and Silver Lake Partners in their review of the revised draft merger agreement. Shortly following circulation of the list, the parties and their respective legal and financial advisors participated in a call to discuss the open transaction terms which related to, among other things, Denali’s financing, including the timing of the marketing period and conditions to funding, a proposed requirement that EMC have a minimum amount of cash on hand at closing to be available in connection with the financing of the transaction, the terms of EMC’s right to solicit alternative acquisition proposals during a go-shop period, the ability of the EMC board of directors to change its recommendation, the parties’ respective termination rights and the size and triggers for termination fees, including a reverse termination fee, EMC’s rights to specific performance, the appropriate efforts standard to obtain the requisite antitrust approvals for the transaction, the treatment of equity awards and other employee compensation and benefits matters and the scope of the parties’ respective conditions to closing. During this call, the parties resolved certain of the identified open issues (including the 60-day duration of the go-shop period and the twelve-month “tail” period for any EMC termination fee) and deferred others for further negotiation and discussion. In response to EMC’s concerns over the certainty of Denali’s financing, Denali indicated that it was seeking to obtain debt commitment letters with a funding condition related to EMC’s business that would follow the material adverse effect definition in the merger agreement (and no condition related to Denali’s existing business or the combined enterprise), and that Denali was reviewing the size of any preferred equity investment. The parties also discussed the status of Denali’s due diligence investigation of EMC. At the conclusion of the call, the parties agreed that certain members of the parties’ respective management teams and Skadden and Simpson Thacher would participate in a call to further discuss the status of the remaining key open business issues and that this call would occur prior to an in-person meeting of the parties’ respective management teams expected to take place on September 29, 2015 in Menlo Park, California. Shortly following the conclusion of the parties’ call on September 26, 2015, a member of EMC’s senior management team contacted a representative of Silver Lake Partners to confirm the timing of the call between Denali’s and EMC’s respective legal advisors and select members of management and to confirm next steps to facilitate a discussion between the parties’ respective business teams on September 29, 2015.
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On the morning of September 28, 2015, Simpson Thacher circulated to EMC, Morgan Stanley and Skadden an updated list of the principal open business issues, identifying the status of, and proposed next steps to resolve, each issue. Later that day, members of each party’s respective management team and Skadden and Simpson Thacher participated in a call to discuss the updated issues list and further discuss each party’s respective position.
On September 29, 2015, EMC’s and Denali’s respective management teams and representatives of Silver Lake Partners met in Menlo Park, California to further discuss the status of the principal open business issues. Representatives of Skadden, Morgan Stanley and Simpson Thacher also participated in the meeting by telephone. Later that day, Skadden and Simpson Thacher participated in a call to negotiate and discuss certain other open legal issues and terms reflected in the draft merger agreement.
Among other matters, the updated list of principal open business issues and related discussions with advisors on September 28-29, 2015 confirmed that EMC and Denali were aligned on the expectation that Denali’s debt commitment letters would not include any material adverse effect condition related to Denali’s business. However, Denali and its representatives indicated that Denali was continuing to look at alternatives related to sizing and terms of potential preferred equity financing and that the availability of specific performance to EMC if such financing were not available remained an open issue. The parties also discussed the need to develop a mutually agreed plan on availability of EMC cash at closing and a minimum amount to be reflected in the merger agreement reflecting an appropriate cushion above forecasted cash levels. The parties further acknowledged that resolution of open issues as to the delivery of opinions of tax counsel as a condition to closing and the level of certainty in such opinions would be dependent on the terms of the tracking stock.
Also on September 29, 2015, a telephonic meeting of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee of the EMC board of directors was held, which certain other members of the EMC board also attended. At the meeting, the directors discussed, among other matters, certain items that they believed should be addressed in an upcoming board update being prepared by management and the company’s financial advisors regarding “Federation 2.X,” including a review of prior analysis of various strategic alternatives and a risk-adjusted valuation of certain “Federation 2.X” alternatives, and the proposed transaction with Denali, including the anticipated trading range for EMC stock upon announcement of a transaction and the anticipated tracking stock value.
On October 1, 2015, in response to the written summary of certain key tracking stock principles proposed by Denali on September 21, Skadden provided Denali and Simpson Thacher with an initial draft of terms related to the proposed tracking stock to be included in the amended and restated certificate of incorporation of Denali to be in effect upon the closing of the proposed transaction. The proposed terms included that the tracking stock be convertible into Denali common stock only at such time as the Denali common stock was publicly traded and at a 20% premium to the relative trading values at such time, that the tracking stock have a separate class vote in certain circumstances, including charter amendments and business combinations, and that the members of the Capital Stock Committee of the board of directors of Denali be agreed upon by Denali and EMC as of signing definitive transaction documents. Through October 12, 2015, EMC, Denali and their respective legal counsel and applicable financial advisors engaged in negotiations of the draft certificate of incorporation and other related tracking stock documents, including by-law provisions of Denali to be adopted in connection with the closing of the proposed transaction and a tracking stock policy statement of the board of directors of Denali setting forth certain procedures intended to protect the rights of the holders of the tracking stock following the closing of the proposed transaction. During this time, the parties discussed and negotiated, among other matters, the voting, conversion, redemption and dividend rights of holders of the tracking stock, as well as matters relating to a Capital Stock Committee of the board of directors of Denali that would oversee certain matters relating to the tracking stock. While certain terms were included in or omitted from the Class V Common Stock in order to further support the intended tax treatment of the transaction and the Class V Common Stock being recognized as common stock of Denali (see “Proposal 1: Approval of the Merger Agreement—Material U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences of the Merger to U.S. Holders”), EMC’s management team and representatives of Skadden and Morgan Stanley were able to negotiate transaction terms that were more favorable to EMC shareholders than
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those originally proposed by Denali. In particular, the parties agreed that the tracking stock would be convertible into Denali common stock only at such time as the Denali common stock was publicly traded and at a premium of 10-20% to the relative trading values at such time depending on the date of conversion, and that the tracking stock would have a separate class vote for certain charter amendments and business combinations. In addition, the parties agreed that (1) prior to consummation of the merger, Denali would consult with the chairman of the EMC board of directors concerning the individuals proposed by Denali to serve on the Denali board of directors following closing who would satisfy the independence requirements of a company listed on the national securities exchange on which the tracking stock would be listed, (2) the chairman of the EMC board of directors would be able to remove from consideration one person so proposed by Denali to serve on the Denali board of directors following consummation of the transaction, and (3) certain restrictions would be included in the Denali charter prohibiting Denali for two years from acquiring shares of VMware if such share acquisitions would cause the VMware common stock to cease to be publicly traded or VMware to cease to file reports under the Exchange Act.
Beginning in the spring of 2015 and continuing through October 12, 2015, representatives of Denali and Silver Lake engaged in extensive negotiations with respect to the arrangement of the debt financing for the transaction, providing representatives of EMC with periodic updates regarding such negotiations. Following such negotiations, a banking group consisting of eight banks and their affiliates agreed to provide debt financing for the transaction. On October 2, 2015, Simpson Thacher circulated to Skadden a revised draft of the merger agreement and drafts of certain documents related to Denali’s proposed equity and debt financing, including a form of common stock purchase agreement pursuant to which certain investors would provide common equity financing for the transaction, a form of securities purchase agreement pursuant to which certain investors would provide preferred equity financing for the transaction and a debt commitment letter. Consistent with prior discussions among Denali, Silver Lake, EMC and certain of their advisors, the debt commitment letter did not include any material adverse effect condition related to Denali’s business. However, the initial draft of the debt commitment letter included a funding condition related to Denali’s proposed preferred equity financing. Through October 12, 2015, EMC, Denali and their respective legal counsel and financial advisors, as well as Mr. Dell, MSD Partners, Silver Lake Partners, and the banks and other parties providing financing, and their respective legal counsel, engaged in negotiations of the documents related to Denali’s proposed equity and debt financing. During this time, EMC and Denali discussed and negotiated, among other matters, deal certainty risks associated with Denali’s ability to secure its proposed preferred equity financing, with the parties ultimately agreeing that Denali’s financing package would consist of debt and common equity and that the SLP investors, the MD stockholders and the MSD Partners stockholders would commit to an aggregate common equity investment of up to $4.25 billion. For more information about the terms of Denali’s debt and equity financing, see “—Financing of the Merger” and “The Merger Agreement—Common Stock Purchase Agreements.”
Also, on October 2, 2015, representatives of EMC’s senior management team met telephonically with representatives of a potential financing source for Denali to discuss the potential transaction.
Also on October 2, 2015, representatives of EMC’s senior management team and representatives of Silver Lake Partners met telephonically to further discuss the proposed transaction between EMC and Denali.
On October 4, 2015, Mr. Green participated in a conference call with members of EMC’s management and representatives of Skadden and Morgan Stanley to review and discuss the key remaining open issues in the draft merger agreement and possible EMC responses with respect to such matters. The call was held in anticipation of a call to be held the next day among Mr. Green, members of EMC’s senior management team and representatives of Silver Lake Partners to continue to discuss and resolve open transaction terms. The discussion focused on matters that could affect deal certainty, including matters related to Denali’s proposed debt and equity financing, such as the timing of the marketing period and risks related to Denali’s proposed preferred equity financing, the parties’ obligations to obtain necessary antitrust approvals, a requirement that EMC have a minimum amount of cash on hand at closing, the parties’ respective termination rights and the size and triggers for termination fees, including a reverse termination fee, and the amount of the proposed per share consideration, including the
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allocation between cash consideration and tracking stock. Representatives of Skadden and Morgan Stanley also reviewed with Mr. Green certain possible key issues related to the tracking stock.
During a call on October 5, 2015, Mr. Green, members of EMC’s senior management team and representatives of Silver Lake Partners discussed key remaining open issues in the draft merger agreement, including the amount of the per share merger consideration and certain key issues related to the tracking stock. Following the call, certain members of EMC’s senior management team and representatives of Silver Lake Partners who participated in the call communicated by email and telephone to confirm resolution of certain items (including per share merger consideration of $33.15, that no closing condition would be included in relation to assertion of appraisal rights by EMC shareholders and that the merger agreement would be governed by Massachusetts law and disputes resolved in Massachusetts courts), and to reiterate the parties’ respective positions with respect to certain remaining open issues.
Also, on October 5, 2015, Mr. Tucci met telephonically with representatives of Temasek, a potential financing source for Denali, to discuss the potential transaction.
On October 6, 2015, the EMC board of directors met in New York City to discuss, among other matters, the proposed transaction with Denali. At the meeting, representatives of Morgan Stanley provided to the board a capital markets update, its updated assessment and financial analysis of various “Federation 2.X” alternatives, its analysis of the issuance of a VMware tracking stock, its updated assessment of a transaction with Denali, including the size of the termination fees under discussion by the parties, its updated valuation of EMC as a standalone company, and its analysis of whether there were other potential competing buyers for a sale transaction. Morgan Stanley also confirmed for the board its view that the proposed transaction with Denali offered a greater risk-adjusted value to EMC shareholders than other strategic alternatives available to the company and also noted that in its view the proposed termination fees to be paid by EMC were unlikely to deter any potential third-party bidders. Morgan Stanley also discussed with the EMC board of directors the favorable comparison of the proposed tracking stock to precedent tracking stocks, in that this would initially be tracking an economic interest in a publicly traded company with an established trading market as well as its own audit committee and governance protocols. Representatives of Evercore also presented their independent preliminary view of the current business environment, tracking stock dynamics and the proposed transaction with Denali. Evercore noted that, in its view and based on the information made available in connection with its preliminary analyses, the proposed transaction with Denali was more attractive than a standalone alternative. The preliminary analyses of Morgan Stanley and Evercore were discussed at the meeting, and the financial analyses used for purposes of Morgan Stanley and Evercore rendering their respective opinions on October 11, 2015 are described below under the headings “—Opinions of EMC’s Financial Advisors—Opinion of Morgan Stanley” and “—Opinions of EMC’s Financial Advisors—Opinion of Evercore.” Representatives of Skadden described provisions of the proposed merger agreement, including the proposed treatment of outstanding equity awards, and provided the directors with an overview of key outstanding issues under negotiation with respect to the draft merger agreement, focusing on matters that could potentially affect deal certainty. Skadden also discussed with the board its fiduciary duties under Massachusetts law. The directors reviewed with members of management forecasts and valuation analyses for the company in comparison to the proposed per share merger consideration, and certain members of management provided the directors with their views regarding the proposed transaction as compared to alternative “Federation 2.X” strategies. EMC’s management also reviewed its analysis of potential revenue synergies of the proposed transaction and discussed with the board preliminary third quarter financial results for 2015, which preliminary results indicated that the company’s storage bookings for the quarter were below those forecasted by management. The directors again considered the concerns and risks associated with alternative strategies and the anticipated transaction value and perceived degree of transaction certainty associated with the proposed transaction with Denali. Thereafter, an independent director provided the board with a summary of his and Mr. Green’s recent discussion with certain senior executives of VMware regarding the proposed transaction, and Mr. Green summarized potential next steps with respect to discussions with Denali. The board also reviewed the principal terms of a proposed engagement letter with Evercore to serve as a financial advisor to the board and directed Mr. Green to continue to finalize the engagement letter.
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Following the meeting of the EMC board of directors, on October 6, 2015, Mr. Strohm resigned from the board of directors and all committees thereof due to increasing conflict with other business and personal obligations.
Also on October 6, 2015, Mr. Green and another independent director of EMC met with certain members of VMware’s executive team and two independent directors who were unaffiliated with EMC in New York City to discuss the proposed transaction with Denali. The VMware executives had previously reviewed McKinsey’s assessment of potential synergies that could be realized as a result of the transaction.
In early October 2015, Mr. Tucci contacted Mr. Dell to discuss EMC’s expectations with respect to its third quarter financial results, including that storage bookings for the quarter were likely to be lower than analyst estimates. Also in early October 2015, a member of EMC’s senior management team separately contacted Mr. Durban to discuss EMC’s expectations with respect to its third quarter financial results.
On October 7, 2015, Mr. Green, Mr. Tucci, several other members of the EMC board of directors, certain members of EMC’s management and representatives of Morgan Stanley met in New York City with two independent directors of VMware who were unaffiliated with EMC to discuss the proposed transaction.
Also on October 7, 2015, EMC entered into a letter agreement with Needham confirming that Needham would receive $500,000 upon the announcement of the merger agreement and $2,000,000 upon the closing of the proposed transaction with Denali for services provided under the terms of the parties’ June 26, 2015 engagement letter.
On October 7, 2015, representatives of EMC’s senior management team met telephonically with representatives of Silver Lake Partners to discuss certain open transaction issues relating to the repatriation of cash in connection with the requirement that EMC have a minimum amount of cash on hand at closing.
On the evening of October 7, 2015, The Wall Street Journal reported that according to unidentified sources Dell and EMC were engaged in discussions regarding a possible transaction.
On October 8, 2015, Skadden provided a revised draft of the merger agreement to representatives of Denali and Silver Lake Partners. From October 8, 2015 through the morning of October 11, 2015, members of EMC’s management team and representatives of Skadden and Morgan Stanley participated in extensive telephonic negotiations with members of Denali’s management team, representatives of Silver Lake Partners and representatives of Simpson Thacher regarding remaining open issues reflected in the draft merger agreement markups and related tracking stock and financing documents. Among the principal issues discussed were the allocation of the per share merger consideration between cash and tracking stock, the termination and reverse termination fee amounts, the circumstances under which either party could terminate the draft merger agreement and receive a fee, the amount of minimum cash on hand EMC would be required to make available at closing, the timing of the marketing period, Denali’s obligation to secure common equity and debt commitments sufficient to close the transaction (regardless of the availability of preferred equity financing), EMC’s ability to issue equity awards between signing and closing, the dividend rights of the holders of the tracking stock and the role of the Capital Stock Committee with respect to the oversight of certain tracking stock matters. During the course of these discussions, EMC’s management team and representatives of Skadden and Morgan Stanley were able to negotiate transaction terms that were more favorable to EMC shareholders than those originally proposed by Denali and that were in addition to the increase in transaction price set forth in the September 23 Letter. In particular, the parties agreed: that the Class V Common Stock would be linked to 65% of EMC’s economic interest in VMware (versus Denali’s proposal of 60% in the September 23 Letter); that the SLP investors, the MD stockholders and the MSD Partners stockholders would commit to an aggregate common equity investment of up to $4.25 billion (eliminating the risk associated with the proposed preferred equity financing); to a reverse termination fee of $4 billion (versus Denali’s original proposal of $2 billion) (increased to $6 billion if Denali and Dell do not make available the amount of cash on hand to be made available by Denali for the purpose of financing the merger); to a decrease to the amount of minimum cash on hand EMC would be required to make
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available at closing (and an increase to the amount of cash on hand to be made available by Denali); to an EMC termination fee of $2.5 billion (versus Denali’s original proposal of $3 billion) outside of the go-shop period; to a $50 million cap on expense reimbursement (versus Denali’s original proposal of uncapped expense reimbursement) to Denali if the merger agreement is terminated in certain circumstances; and to a two-business day reset period (versus five business days proposed by Denali) for match rights resulting from any amendment to financial or other material terms (as well as an exception to match rights in the case of an acquisition proposal valued at 115% or more of the merger consideration). In addition, the parties agreed to reciprocal closing conditions with respect to receipt of tax opinions from counsel that the merger, taken together with related transactions, should qualify as an exchange described in Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code and that for U.S. federal income tax purposes the Class V Common Stock should be considered common stock of Denali.
In October 2015, after the board’s consideration of Evercore’s qualifications, expertise, reputation and relationships, and negotiations as to the terms of its engagement, and in order to secure the advice of a second independent financial advisor in connection with EMC’s evaluation of a sale transaction, EMC entered into a letter agreement, dated October 9, 2015, confirming EMC’s engagement of Evercore to act as a financial advisor to the EMC board of directors.
On October 11, 2015, the EMC board of directors met telephonically to consider the terms of the proposed transaction with Denali. Members of EMC’s management team and representatives of Skadden and Morgan Stanley also participated in the meeting. A representative of Skadden stated that discussions regarding the draft merger agreement were substantially complete and led the directors through a discussion of a detailed written summary of the merger terms and conditions and the proposed tracking stock terms. The representative from Skadden also discussed with the board the limited open transaction terms under final discussion with representatives of Denali and Silver Lake Partners, including tax treatment for holders of the tracking stock in the event of future changes to tax laws, EMC’s and Denali’s respective caps on liability and the ability of EMC to grant equity awards prior to closing of the proposed transaction, and reviewed with the directors their fiduciary duties in considering the proposed transaction, including applicable standards for director conduct under Massachusetts law. Representatives of Morgan Stanley also provided Morgan Stanley’s assessment of certain key transaction terms, including the terms of the go-shop provision and the size of the termination fees. Representatives of Morgan Stanley and Evercore discussed with the board of directors their respective financial analyses of the proposed transaction, and following their respective discussions, delivered to the EMC board of directors their respective oral opinions, subsequently confirmed in writing, that, as of October 11, 2015, and based upon and subject to the factors, procedures, assumptions, qualifications, limitations and other matters set forth in their respective written opinions, the per share merger consideration set forth in the merger agreement to be received by the holders of EMC common stock entitled to receive such merger consideration was fair, from a financial point of view, to such holders. As the EMC board of directors received fairness opinions from Morgan Stanley and Evercore, the EMC board of directors did not determine it necessary to obtain a fairness opinion with respect to the proposed transaction from an additional financial advisor. For more information about Morgan Stanley’s and Evercore’s respective opinions, see the discussion under the headings “—Opinions of EMC’s Financial Advisors—Opinion of Morgan Stanley” and “—Opinions of EMC’s Financial Advisors—Opinion of Evercore.” The directors engaged in a detailed discussion of the terms and conditions of the draft merger agreement, including their respective views on the remaining open transaction terms, with the representatives of Skadden. Following further discussion and careful consideration of the potential reasons for and against the proposed transaction (see “—EMC’s Reasons for the Merger; Recommendation of the EMC Board of Directors” for additional information), the EMC board of directors unanimously declared the merger agreement and the transactions contemplated thereby advisable and in the best interests of EMC and its shareholders and approved and adopted the merger agreement and the transactions contemplated thereby in all respects, subject to Mr. Green’s satisfaction, on behalf of the board of directors, of the resolution of the remaining open transaction issues discussed at the meeting.
Following the meeting of EMC’s board of directors, during the evening of October 11, 2015, representatives of EMC, Denali and Silver Lake Partners came to agreement on the remaining open transaction terms.
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Representatives of EMC described and discussed the resolution of these matters with Mr. Green, who, on behalf of the EMC board of directors, expressed his satisfaction with such terms. Following the discussion with Mr. Green, legal counsel to EMC, Denali and Silver Lake Partners finalized the transaction documents.
On the morning of October 12, 2015, EMC, Denali and Dell executed the merger agreement. As planned, EMC and Dell then issued a joint press release announcing the transaction.
Following the announcement of the transaction, on October 12, 2015, Elliott Management publicly expressed its strong support for the transaction.
Under the merger agreement, during the “go-shop period” that began on the date of the merger agreement and continued until 11:59 p.m. (Eastern time) on December 11, 2015, EMC was permitted to solicit, initiate, encourage and facilitate acquisition proposals from unaffiliated third parties, including by providing unaffiliated third parties with nonpublic information pursuant to acceptable confidentiality agreements, and to enter into, continue or otherwise participate in discussions or negotiations with any unaffiliated third party in connection with an acquisition proposal. In the go-shop process, representatives of EMC or Morgan Stanley contacted a total of 15 parties (including 10 potential strategic buyers and 5 potential financial buyers) regarding each such party’s interest in exploring a transaction with EMC. Company X was not among the potential strategic buyers contacted during the go-shop period due to changes in the structure and business of Company X which had significantly reduced the strategic rationale for a transaction with EMC and the ability of Company X to undertake such a transaction. Company Y was contacted during the go-shop period but declined to enter into a confidentiality agreement or participate in discussions. No party entered into a confidentiality agreement with EMC. Through the end of the go-shop period, no party submitted an acquisition proposal to EMC or its representatives with respect to a possible transaction.
On May 16, 2016, EMC, Denali, Dell and Merger Sub entered into an amendment to the merger agreement to facilitate mechanisms for timely and orderly allocation of the merger consideration.
EMC’s Reasons for the Merger; Recommendation of the EMC Board of Directors
At a meeting held on October 11, 2015, the EMC board of directors unanimously determined that the merger agreement and the transactions contemplated thereby, including the proposed merger, are advisable and in the best interest of EMC and its shareholders, and unanimously resolved to approve and adopt the merger agreement and the transactions contemplated thereby, including the proposed Merger. The EMC board of directors unanimously recommends that EMC shareholders vote “FOR” the approval of the merger agreement.
In evaluating the proposed transaction, the EMC board of directors consulted with EMC’s management and advisors and, in reaching its determination and recommendation, considered a number of factors. The EMC board of directors also consulted with outside legal counsel regarding its obligations and the terms of the merger agreement and the Class V Common Stock.
Many of the factors that were considered favored the conclusion of the EMC board of directors that the merger agreement and the transactions contemplated thereby are advisable and in the best interests of EMC and its shareholders, including the following:
| • | the belief of the EMC board of directors that, as a result of negotiations between the parties, the merger consideration was the highest value per share for EMC common stock that Denali was willing to pay at the time of those negotiations, and that the combination of Denali’s agreement to pay such consideration and the go-shop process described below and under “The Merger Agreement—Solicitation of Acquisition Proposals” would result in a sale of EMC at the highest value per share for the EMC common stock that was reasonably available; |
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| • | the anticipated value of the per share merger consideration in comparison to historical trading prices for shares of EMC common stock, which per share merger consideration had an implied value of $33.15 per share based on the offer of $24.05 cash and an estimated 0.111 shares of Class V Common Stock for each share of EMC common stock (assuming a valuation for one such share of Class V Common Stock of $81.78, the intraday volume-weighted average price of VMware Class A common stock on October 7, 2015 (the last trading date prior to press reports that Denali and EMC were engaged in discussions regarding a possible transaction)), which assumption was used by the EMC board of directors while recognizing that the market price of the Class V Common Stock may not directly correlate to the market price of the VMware Class A common stock, as discussed with each of Morgan Stanley and Evercore, representing a premium of approximately 28% to the closing price of EMC common stock on October 7, 2015 (based on the assumption described above and subject to the limitations recognized with respect to such assumption by the EMC board of directors noted above); |
| • | the review and consideration by the EMC board of directors with its financial advisors of the relationship of the potential trading price of Class V Common Stock to the trading price of VMware Class A common stock, which review included: |
| • | Morgan Stanley’s consideration of potential changes in the trading price of the Class V Common Stock relative to the VMware Class A common stock and its sensitivities analysis assuming a discount / premium range of (5.0%) – 5.0%, and |
| • | Evercore’s consideration that the Class V Common Stock may be valued at a discount to the trading price of VMware Class A common stock on October 7, 2015 (the last trading date prior to press reports that Denali and EMC were engaged in discussions regarding a possible transaction) and sensitivities conducted by Evercore assuming for illustrative purposes a discount within a range of 0-10%; |
and, following such review and consideration, the belief of the EMC board of directors that the trading price of Class V Common Stock would likely bear a relationship to the trading price of VMware Class A common stock and the recognition of the EMC board of directors that such relationship could result in the Class V Common Stock trading at a premium or discount to the trading price of VMware Class A common stock;
| • | the fact that a large portion of the merger consideration will be paid in cash, giving EMC shareholders the opportunity to immediately realize value for a significant portion of their investment and providing certainty of value for such portion; |
| • | the fact that a portion of the merger consideration will be paid in Class V Common Stock initially intended to track, in the aggregate, approximately 65% of EMC’s current economic interest in the VMware business, and give EMC shareholders who retain the Class V Common Stock payable in the transaction the opportunity to benefit from synergies anticipated to be realized by VMware, which were considered by the EMC board of directors within a potential range of approximately $1.1 billion – $1.3 billion attributable to VMware as a result of the transaction, as estimated by EMC management with the assistance of outside consultants and informed by discussions with and information available from Denali and VMware, including potential revenue synergies deriving from product complementarity, expanded sales channels and access to emerging markets; and the consideration by the EMC board of directors of the comparison of the Class V Common Stock to precedent tracking stocks, including that the Class V Common Stock would initially be intended to track solely an interest in another publicly-traded company and, when taken together with the fact that the Class V Common Stock would contain different characteristics from the VMware Class A common stock that may affect its market price in distinct ways, would potentially provide investors with a publicly-traded stock with an established trading market to look to for purposes of valuing the VMware business, as well as that, as distinguished from precedent tracking stocks, VMware as a public company would have its own audit committee and governance protocols; |
| • | the familiarity of the EMC board of directors with, and understanding of, the business, assets, financial condition, results of operations, current business strategy and prospects of EMC and its subsidiaries; |
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| • | the merger consideration to be achieved in the proposed transaction with Denali was viewed to present a higher likelihood of delivering greater value to shareholders than strategic alternatives available to EMC after taking into account the execution risks and other concerns of the EMC board of directors as to the ability to successfully implement such alternatives, as described in “—Background of the Merger” on pages 165 and 166, which alternatives included changes to EMC’s business and operations and capital structure, issuing shares of VMware common stock held by EMC to EMC shareholders in a “spin-off” transaction and seeking alternative transactions with other third parties, in each case, considering the potential for EMC shareholders to share in any future earnings or growth of EMC’s and VMware’s business; |
| • | the projected long-term financial results of EMC as an independent, publicly owned company and related macroeconomic and industry-specific trends and risks, and the projected long-term financial results of VMware; |
| • | the review by the EMC board of directors with its legal and financial advisors, as applicable, of the structure of the proposed transaction and the financial and other terms of the merger agreement, including the terms of the Class V Common Stock, the parties’ representations, warranties and covenants, the conditions to their respective obligations and the termination provisions, as well as the likelihood of consummation of the proposed transaction and the evaluation of the EMC board of directors of the likely time period necessary to complete the transaction; |
| • | the fact that the merger agreement permits EMC to declare and pay to its shareholders regular quarterly dividends of up to $0.115 per share of EMC common stock during the period prior to the completion of the transaction; |
| • | the closing conditions included in the merger agreement, including the condition that EMC receive an opinion from its tax counsel confirming the U.S. federal income tax treatment of the merger and the Class V Common Stock, and also including the exceptions to the events that would constitute a material adverse effect on EMC for purposes of the merger agreement, as well as the likelihood of satisfaction of all conditions to completion of the transaction; |
| • | the go-shop provisions included in the merger agreement, as well as exceptions to the no-shop provisions that apply after the end of the go-shop period, that are intended to help ensure that EMC shareholders receive the highest price per share reasonably attainable, including: |
| • | EMC’s right to solicit offers with respect to alternative acquisition proposals during a 60-day go-shop period and to participate in discussions or negotiations with certain third parties that make acquisition proposals during the go-shop period until EMC’s shareholders approve the merger agreement; |
| • | EMC’s right, subject to certain conditions, to respond to and negotiate with respect to certain unsolicited acquisition proposals made after the end of the go-shop period and prior to the time EMC’s shareholders approve the merger agreement; |
| • | the ability of the EMC board of directors to withdraw or change its recommendation of the merger agreement (subject to Denali’s right to terminate the merger agreement), and EMC’s right to terminate the merger agreement and accept a superior proposal prior to EMC shareholders’ approval of the merger agreement, subject in each case to EMC paying Denali a termination fee of $2.5 billion (or $2.0 billion if EMC terminates the merger agreement to accept a superior proposal during the go-shop period) in connection with such termination, which amount the EMC board of directors believed was reasonable in light of, among other matters, the benefits of the transaction to EMC’s shareholders, the typical size of such termination fees in similar transactions and the likelihood that a fee of such size would not be a meaningful deterrent to alternative acquisition proposals, as more fully described under “The Merger Agreement—Termination Fees”; and |
| • | the belief of the EMC board of directors, following consultation with Morgan Stanley, that the right of Denali to negotiate with EMC for a limited time period to match the terms of any superior proposal would not materially deter an interested third party from making an acquisition proposal; |
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| • | the fact that the consent of the Capital Stock Committee of the Denali board of directors will be required in connection with certain actions the Denali board of directors may take in respect of the Class V Common Stock, and that a majority of the members of the Capital Stock Committee must qualify as independent directors, as more fully described under “Description of Denali Tracking Stock Policy”; |
| • | the requirement that prior to the completion of the transaction, Denali consult with the chairman of the EMC board of directors concerning the individuals proposed by Denali to serve on the Denali board of directors following the completion of the transaction who satisfy the independence requirements of a company listed on the national securities exchange on which the Class V Common Stock will be listed, and the ability of the chairman of the EMC board of directors to remove from consideration one person so proposed by Denali to serve on the Denali board of directors following the completion of the transaction; |
| • | the fact that the Denali board of directors will adopt the Denali Tracking Stock Policy (described under “Description of Denali Tracking Stock Policy”), the terms of which were negotiated between EMC and Denali, to serve as guidelines in making decisions regarding the relationships between the DHI Group and the Class V Group with respect to matters such as tax liabilities and benefits, inter-group debt, inter-group interests, allocation and reallocation of assets, financing alternatives, corporate opportunities, payment of dividends and similar items, and that the Denali board of directors may not change or make exceptions to these policies without the approval of the Capital Stock Committee, the majority of the members of which must qualify as independent directors, as well as the fact that the DHI Group and the Class V Group will be parts of a single company and the Denali board of directors will have the same fiduciary duties to the stockholders of Denali as a whole (and not to an individual group) and that the negotiated terms of the Denali Tracking Stock Policy, as well as the composition of the Capital Stock Committee of a majority independent directors, were intended to mitigate issues with respect to potential conflicts of interest between the DHI Group and the Class V Group; |
| • | the likelihood of the transaction being completed , based on, among other matters: |
| • | Denali’s having obtained committed debt and equity financing for the transaction, the limited number and nature of the conditions to the funding of the debt and equity financing, the reputation of the financing sources and the obligations of Denali pursuant to the merger agreement to obtain the debt financing and equity financing and cause such financing to be funded; |
| • | the absence of a financing condition in the merger agreement; |
| • | EMC’s ability, under circumstances specified in the merger agreement, to seek specific performance of Denali’s obligations under the merger agreement, including to cause the common equity financing sources under the common equity purchase agreements described under “—Financing of the Merger” to fund their respective investments as contemplated by those agreements; and |
| • | the requirement that, in the event of a failure of the transaction to be completed under certain circumstances, Denali pay EMC a termination fee of $4 billion, or an alternative termination fee of $6 billion in certain circumstances where Denali has failed to make available the amount of cash on hand required by the merger agreement as described under “The Merger Agreement—Termination Fees,” without EMC’s having to establish any damages; |
| • | Denali’s stated intent with respect to investing in the Boston area community, and its agreement to maintain the global headquarters of the combined enterprise systems business of Denali and EMC in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for a period of at least 10 years following the completion of the transaction and the anticipated benefits to EMC’s employees and the economies of the region and state resulting therefrom; |
| • | the opinion of Morgan Stanley, dated October 11, 2015, to the EMC board of directors that, as of such date, and based on and subject to the factors, procedures, assumptions, qualifications, limitations and |
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| other matters set forth in its written opinion, the merger consideration to be received by the holders of shares of EMC common stock pursuant to the merger agreement was fair from a financial point of view to the holders of EMC common stock. The opinion is more fully described under “—Opinions of EMC’s Financial Advisors—Opinion of Morgan Stanley”); and |
| • | the financial analyses of Evercore, financial advisor to EMC, and the opinion of Evercore, dated October 11, 2015, to the EMC board of directors with respect to the fairness to the holders of shares of EMC common stock entitled to receive such merger consideration, from a financial point of view, of the merger consideration, which opinion was based on and subject to the factors, procedures, assumptions, qualifications, limitations and other matters set forth in the opinion, as more fully described under “—Opinions of EMC’s Financial Advisors—Opinion of Evercore”). |
In the course of its deliberations, the EMC board of directors also considered a variety of risks and other potentially negative factors, including the following:
| • | the restrictions the merger agreement imposes on soliciting competing proposals after the go-shop period and the customary matching rights in favor of Denali prior to any termination of the merger agreement by EMC to accept a superior proposal; |
| • | the fact that, other than with respect to the Class V Common Stock received in the merger, which is intended to represent a portion of Denali’s economic interest in the VMware business following completion of the merger, EMC shareholders will have no ongoing equity participation in EMC following the transaction and will cease to participate in EMC’s future earnings or growth, if any, or benefit from increases, if any, in the value of EMC common stock; |
| • | the possibility that Denali could, at a later date, engage in unspecified transactions, including a restructuring, special dividend or sale of some or all of EMC or its assets, including shares of VMware common stock held by EMC (in which case the holders of Class V Common Stock may be entitled to certain proceeds and/or certain protections, as more fully described under “Description of Denali Capital Stock Following the Merger” and “Description of Denali Tracking Stock Policy,” respectively), to one or more purchasers which could conceivably produce a higher aggregate value than that available to EMC’s shareholders in the transaction; |
| • | the fact that no public market for the Class V Common Stock currently exists and that the market price of the Class V Common Stock may not directly correlate to the market price of VMware Class A common stock given the different characteristics of the two securities, as discussed with each of Morgan Stanley and Evercore; |
| • | the fact that the aggregate number of shares of Class V Common Stock to be received by EMC shareholders as consideration upon the close of the transaction was fixed at the signing of the merger agreement, that a decrease in the market price of VMware Class A common stock during the pendency of the transaction may adversely affect the value of the Class V Common Stock received by EMC shareholders upon the completion of the transaction, and that the merger agreement does not provide for any price-based protection with respect to the market price of the Class V Common Stock; |
| • | risks related to Denali’s tracking stock capital structure and the characteristics of the Class V Common Stock as described under the section titled “Risk Factors—Risk Factors Relating to Denali’s Proposed Tracking Stock Structure,” which include the potential for Denali’s tracking stock capital structure to create conflicts of interest and decisions by the Denali board of directors that could adversely affect only some holders of Denali’s common stock; the nature and characteristics of the proposed Class V Common Stock, certain terms of which were negotiated between EMC and Denali in order that the Class V Common Stock be treated as common stock of Denali to support the intended tax treatment of the transaction (see “Proposal 1: Approval of the Merger Agreement—Material U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences of the Merger to U.S. Holders”), and that the characteristics of the Class V Common Stock, including by virtue of being a tracking stock, are distinct in many respects from the characteristics of EMC common stock; |
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| • | the possibility that the transaction may not be completed or that completion may be unduly delayed for reasons beyond the control of EMC, including the potential length of the regulatory review process and the risk that applicable antitrust, competition and other governmental authorities may prohibit or enjoin the transaction or otherwise impose conditions in order to obtain clearance for the transaction; |
| • | the possibility that, under certain circumstances under the merger agreement, EMC may be required to pay Denali a termination fee of $2.5 billion (or $2.0 billion if EMC terminates the merger agreement to accept a superior proposal during the go-shop period), and that such fee (or up to $50 million of expense reimbursement) may also be payable by EMC to Denali under certain circumstances following the termination of the merger agreement, as more fully described under “The Merger Agreement—Termination Fees”; |
| • | the risk that the debt financing contemplated by the debt commitment letter or the common equity financing contemplated by the common equity purchase agreements might not be obtained, resulting in Denali and its affiliates not having sufficient funds to complete the transaction; |
| • | the fact that the aggregate amount of the debt financing contemplated by the debt commitment letter and the common equity financing contemplated by the common equity purchase agreements is less than the cash merger consideration and that Denali and EMC will be required to make available at the closing cash on hand, as more fully described under “The Merger Agreement—Denali Cash on Hand” and “The Merger Agreement—Liquidation of Investments; Cash Transfers,” respectively, in order to fund payment of the cash merger consideration; |
| • | the fact that EMC’s entitlement to specific performance under the merger agreement to cause Denali to cause the common equity financing to be funded and to cause Denali to complete the transaction is subject to certain requirements, as more fully described under “The Merger Agreement—Specific Performance; Governing Law and Jurisdiction; Third-Party Beneficiaries—Specific Performance”; |
| • | the fact that in the event the transaction is not completed, EMC’s sole monetary remedy against Denali is limited to receipt of a $4 billion (or $6 billion in certain circumstances where Denali has failed to make available the amount of cash on hand required by the merger agreement) termination fee payable by Denali under the applicable circumstances provided by the merger agreement, as more fully described under “The Merger Agreement—Termination Fees”; |
| • | the risks and costs to EMC if the transaction does not close, including: |
| • | uncertainty about the effect of the proposed merger on EMC’s employees, customers and other parties, which may impair EMC’s ability to attract, retain and motivate key personnel, and could cause customers, suppliers, financial counterparties, joint venture partners and others to seek to change existing business relationships with EMC; |
| • | that EMC is required under the merger agreement to use commercially reasonable efforts to conduct its business in the ordinary course consistent with past practice until the transaction is completed or the merger agreement terminates, subject to limited exceptions, and, without the consent of Denali, will be prohibited from making acquisitions and investments, accessing the debt and capital markets and taking other specified actions until the transaction is completed or the merger agreement terminates, which may prevent EMC from pursuing otherwise attractive business opportunities and taking other actions with respect to its business that it may consider advantageous; |
| • | the fact that the receipt of cash in partial consideration of shares of EMC common stock pursuant to the transaction will be a taxable transaction for U.S. federal income tax purposes; |
| • | the transaction costs to be incurred in connection with the proposed transaction, including in connection with any litigation that may result from the announcement or pendency of the transaction, some of which will be payable even if the transaction is not completed; |
| • | the risk that EMC shareholders may not approve the merger agreement; and |
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| • | risks of the type and nature described under the sections titled “Risk Factors” and “Cautionary Information Regarding Forward-Looking Statements,” respectively, and in the documents incorporated herein by reference. |
The EMC board of directors considered all of these factors as a whole and, on balance, concluded that they supported a determination to approve the merger agreement. The foregoing discussion of the information and factors considered by the EMC board of directors is not exhaustive. In view of the wide variety of factors considered by the EMC board of directors in connection with its evaluation of the proposed transaction and the complexity of these matters, the EMC board of directors did not consider it practical to, nor did it attempt to, quantify, rank or otherwise assign relative weights to the specific factors that it considered in reaching its decision. The EMC board of directors evaluated the factors described above, among others, and reached a consensus that the merger agreement and the transactions contemplated thereby, including the transaction, were advisable and in the best interests of EMC and its shareholders. In considering the factors described above and any other factors, individual members of the EMC board of directors may have viewed factors differently or given different weight or merit to different factors.
The EMC board of directors made its determination as to the advisability of the proposed merger and unanimously resolved to approve and adopt the merger agreement and to recommend that EMC shareholders vote in favor of the approval of the merger agreement at a meeting of the EMC board of directors held on October 11, 2015, and on October 12, 2015, EMC, Denali and Dell executed the merger agreement. Following such determination and in accordance with the terms of the merger agreement, EMC conducted a “go-shop” process to solicit alternative acquisition proposals. No party submitted an acquisition proposal to EMC or its representatives with respect to a possible transaction during the go-shop period and no acquisition proposals have been received as of the date of this proxy statement/prospectus. As of the date of this proxy statement/prospectus, the implied value of the merger consideration is $30.94 per share based on $24.05 cash and an estimated 0.111 shares of Class V Common Stock for each share of EMC common stock (assuming a valuation for one such share of Class V Common Stock of $62.08, the closing price of VMware Class A common stock on June 3, 2016 (the most recent practicable trading date prior to the date of this proxy statement/prospectus)), representing a premium of approximately 19% to the closing price of EMC common stock on October 7, 2015, the last trading date prior to press reports that Denali and EMC were engaged in discussions regarding a possible transaction. The EMC board of directors has not requested or received updated fairness opinions from its financial advisors (see “Risk Factors—Risk Factors Relating to the Merger—The fairness opinions obtained by the EMC board of directors from its financial advisors will not reflect changes, circumstances, developments or events that may occur or may have occurred after the date of the opinions”) and continues to recommend that EMC shareholders vote in favor of the approval of the merger agreement.
